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Abstract 
Latin America witnessed the election of ‘new Left’ governments in the early twenty-
first century that, in different ways, sought to open a debate about alternatives to 
paradigms of neoliberal development. What has this meant for how human rights are 
understood and for patterns of human rights compliance? Using qualitative and 
quantitative evidence, we discuss the ways human rights are imagined and the 
compliance records of new Left governments through the lens of the three 
‘generations’ of human rights (political and civil, social and economic, and cultural 
and environmental rights). We draw in particular on evidence from Andean countries 
and the Southern Cone. While basic civil and individual liberties are still far from 
guaranteed, especially in the Andean region, new Left countries show better overall 
performances in relation to socio-economic rights, with respect to the past and to 
other Latin American countries. All new Left governments also show an increasing 
interest in ‘third’ generation rights (cultural and environmental rights), though this is 
especially marked in the Andean Left. We discuss the tensions around interpretations 
and categories of human rights, reflect on the stagnation of first generation rights and 
note the difficulties associated with translating second and third generation rights into 
policy.  
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More than twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the global human rights 
agenda is in a state of flux. Although global issues are frequently framed through the 
lens of human rights (Grugel et al., 2017), those rights are increasingly under 
challenge. According to Amnesty International, global rights abuses reached 
exceptional levels in 2014, and violations of basic freedoms continued to grow in 
number and scale in 2015-2016 (AI, 2014/2015 and AI, 2015/2016). It is clear that the 
task of upholding political and civil liberties and delivering social, economic and 
cultural rights, even for states that genuinely endorse the principle of rights-based 
governance, is fraught with difficulties. Governments sometimes lack the resources or 
the legitimacy to pursue rights policies and social and political conflicts arise around 
what upholding human rights means. These problems can be exceptionally acute in 
societies characterized by high levels of inequality and cultural intolerance.  
Additionally, the human rights landscape has become particularly complex in 
recent years. Traditionally, most attention has been paid to rights as freedom from 
state oppression or political and civil rights. But the expansion of the human rights 
agenda, the resurgence of socio-economic claims framed as human rights and a 
greater emphasis on cultural and collective rights have created a more diffuse and 
nuanced debate. Few areas of the world exemplify the contemporary challenges in 
relation to rights ‘delivery’ and the expansion of the human rights agenda more than 
Latin America. Despite democratization, routine abuse of political and civil rights 
continue and levels of state violence, especially against the poor, remain high; and 
access to even basic services continues to be defined by race, gender and income. Yet 
social movements use rights standardly to claim entitlements and invoking 
international human rights standards is part of the everyday lexicon of elites. There is 
also evidence, as we discuss here, that human rights are no longer framed in 
exclusively liberal fashion. All of this means that it is not a simple matter to describe 
governments’ compliance with human rights – we must ask compliant with which and 
with whose rights?  
This question has come to the fore in a particularly pressing fashion following 
the election of an unprecedented number of left-wing governments in the early years 
of the twenty-first century across Latin America, including Venezuela (1998), Brazil 
(2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), 
Nicaragua (2007) and, for shorter periods, in Honduras (2006), Paraguay (2008), El 
Salvador (2009) and Peru (2011). This conjuncture - a unicum in the region’s history 
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(Madrid, 2010) - has been described as a ‘Pink Tide’, to reflect both its sudden and 
widespread rise as well as its leftist (but not communist) political orientation. In all 
these countries, the shift to the Left was born out of the discontent with a decade or 
more of neoliberal politics. It led to a moderate to radical shift in economic and social 
policies to improve social inclusion and redistribution. But instead of looking to the 
past and at the orthodox leftist tradition, some ‘new Left’ governments have sought to 
create more direct forms of citizenship participation by appealing to both ‘old’ and 
‘new’ social movements, alongside a distinctive political style that draws to different 
degrees on populism, nationalism and Panamericanism (Arnson, 2007; Cameron and 
Hershberg, 2010; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Webber and Carr, 2012; Weyland et 
al., 2010).     
All new Left governments promised a more radical engagement with human 
rights as part of a renegotiation of citizenship (Radcliffe, 2012); but they have not all 
understood the agenda of human rights in the same way or, at least, they have not all 
prioritized the same set of rights. Our purpose in this article is to draw out the ways 
human rights have been imagined and instantiated and to explore how far new 
patterns of rights compliance are emerging. Qualitative and quantitative evidence 
reveals shifts in how human rights are being interpreted by leftist governments, as 
well as differences in the rights they prioritise. There are advances in the delivery of 
some human rights and retreat in others.  
To present our data and frame our argument, we use the established division 
of human rights into three generations – political and civil, socio-economic and 
cultural and environmental rights. Broadly speaking, Left governments perform 
marginally worse in protecting civil and political liberties and respect for the rule of 
law than governments in the rest of Latin America; but there are considerable national 
and sub-regional variations (notably between the Andean region and the Southern 
Cone) and, moreover, the regional trend as a whole is towards stagnation. New Left 
governments also seem to place greater stress on socio-economic rights than in the 
past and compared to other Latin American countries. Overall, the ‘interruption’ of 
neoliberalism’ (Goodale and Postero, 2013) and the efforts to move ‘beyond’ 
neoliberal social governance led to the introduction of a raft of welfare policies that, 
taken together, reduced inequalities as well as poverty and extreme poverty. This 
approach emerged in the context of an export bonanza and economic growth that 
encouraged the adoption of more expansive public spending in much of Latin 
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America; the future of these policies, which have been much less consensual than 
earlier generations of welfare, may now be under threat as the era of expansive 
growth comes to an end (Madrid, 2010). Finally, there has been an expansion of the 
human rights agenda with the inclusion of third generation rights, namely cultural and 
environmental rights. This is the case across the Left but it is especially marked in the 
Andean countries where these rights have been incorporated into constitutional and 
legal frameworks.  
 
Studying the Left and Human Rights in Latin America: Challenges of 
Interpretation, Data and Methods  
 
How governments understand and enact human rights is an important window onto 
their vision of the ‘good society’. Human rights are not a set of normative principles 
‘suspended in outer space’ (Mutua, 2002: 39). They are the ‘stuff’ of daily life and the 
decision to respect – or not – a particular set of rights can have far reaching 
consequences for the quality of life of individuals and social groups. There is 
agreement that state capacity plays a practical role in explaining the degree of 
compliance (Landman, 2002). But compliance is not just determined by whether 
governments have the resources to deliver rights.  Even though human rights are set 
out in international agreements and conventions, what rights mean can be contested 
and the process by which rights are interpreted and prioritized is complex and subject 
to change. Geography, context, culture and politics matter.  
National and regional contexts shape how the corpus of human rights is 
interpreted in a given place or time. The extent to which liberal and Enlightenment 
values that underpin political and civil rights are legitimate in the eyes of elites, civil 
societies and communities shapes engagement with international rights agreements. 
Additionally, right- and left-wing governments and movements, in Latin America and 
elsewhere, tend to understand human rights in quite different ways (Brooks and Kurtz, 
2007; Cohrs  et al., 2005; Mosley, 2008; Smith and Morton, 2006). And whether local 
civil societies are embedded in transnational advocacy networks can influence how 
far they see human rights as useful tool for advocacy or an end goal (Grugel and 
Peruzzotti, 2012; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Simmons, 2009). Experiences of economic 
globalization also affect engagement with, and practices of human rights in the global 
South. The global neoliberal revolution that began in the 1980s impacted negatively 
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on the commitment and capacity of governments to defend both political and civil 
rights and socio-economic entitlements.1 This may have contributed to something of a 
backlash against rights agendas associated with pro-Western liberal thought. 
In Latin America, human rights ideas have traditionally found fertile ground 
despite the fact that they are said to reflect European and Enlightenment values 
(Donnelly,  2007; Gould, 2004). Some would argue this is because European values 
are themselves ingrained in the region’s political culture (Fuentes, 1999). Claiming 
human rights generally makes sense for Latin American social movements and civil 
society (Peruzzotti, 2002; Sikkink, 2005;). For these reasons, considerable scholarly 
attention has been paid to unpacking the impact of democratization on human rights 
(Molyneux, 2008; Yashar, 2005; Panizza, 2009) and to examining cases of rights 
abuses in particular countries. But, much less attention has been paid as yet to how the 
election of left-wing governments has reshaped the human rights agenda in the region.  
One of the challenges in doing so refers to whether we are witnessing a 
consolidated phenomenon: the rise of a regional Left with shared understandings of 
society, politics and human rights or the emergence of different political movements 
each seeking to implement its own vision (Altvater, 2009; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 
2008; White and Williams, 2012).  On the one hand, in the early years of the 
twentieth century, left governments, from Venezuela to Brazil, all openly questioned 
the preeminence of market and raised taxes to pay for public services and welfare. On 
the other, political styles differ significantly. Castañeda (2006) has been the most 
prominent advocate of the ‘two Lefts’ argument, tracing an essential distinction 
between radical leftist movements associated with populism, clientelism and 
autocratic governance, and those more firmly in the liberal democratic tradition. A 
number of authors have supported this distinction focusing in particular on different 
political styles and economic policies (Madrid, 2010; Petkoff, 2005; Weyland, 2009; 
Weyland et al., 2010), while others have criticized it for being overly simplistic and 
failing to account for the important variations between so-called ‘left-populist’ and 
‘left-liberal’ governments (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011; Ramírez Gallegos, 2006). 
Examining the new Left(s) through their engagements with human rights adds another 
layer to this important debate.  
																																																								1	See Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007) who found that neoliberal reforms were associated with a 
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However, finding empirical data to address this deficit in the literature is not 
easy. Gathering systematic information on rights compliance and rights violations is, 
in general, not straightforward. Challenges in assessing the human rights records of 
governments include availability, access and trustworthiness of data, comparability 
across countries and rights sectors. Standard practice is to understand human rights as 
‘bundles’ of different rights, usually referred to as first, second and third generation 
rights. Although this distinction is not explicit in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the classification, first theorized by Karel Vasak2, has been used as an 
analytical tool to classify human rights norms according to broad overarching topics, 
while emphasizing the chronological evolution and the different time-lines of their 
codification in international agreements. Civil and political rights are the oldest and 
are rooted in the Eighteenth century bills of rights in early democratic states. Social 
and economic rights were recognized by states after the Second World War, while 
third generation rights have been partially codified only since the 1980s and refer to a 
heterogeneous sets of norms around the environment and climate change, cultural 
diversity and ethnic self-determination as well as access to development and 
communication rights. Different quantitative datasets have been created over time, for 
first and second generations (i.e. political and civil and socio-economic) but, for third 
generation rights, no standard codification has yet been developed.  
Moreover, even standardized and widely used quantitative data on rights 
compliance have recognized and intrinsic limitations. There can, for example, be 
problems of validity and consistency3, and ‘information effects’ derived from how 
data are collected can affect interpretation (Clark and Sikkink, 2013). Measures and 
operationalization criteria inevitably reflect underlying normative assumptions. These 
problems can be accentuated by focusing on political orientation as an independent 
variable, carrying the risk of negative biases (Landman, 2002). When it comes to 
socio-economic rights, difficulties include the fact that it is not a question of 																																																								
2 This scholar suggested that the three generations of human rights stemmed respectively from the three 
ideals proclaimed by the French revolution (liberty, equality and fraternity) and thought of third 
generation rights as solidarity rights (Vasak 1977). For a critical perspective see Wellman 2000.  
3 For socio-economic indicators, national statistics mainly rely on household surveys data. In most 
countries however those surveys have changed over time both in terms of questions and geographic 
coverage. Also for certain indicators (e.g. pensions and primary education access) only partially 
complete datasets are available.  
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monitoring violations so much as assessing performance and establishing the extent to 
which social and economic provision is grounded in rights in theory and practice. 
There is always a risk of attributing improvements in socio-economic outcomes to 
conscious decisions by governments, rather than, for example, the result of longer-
term social, economic or infrastructural investments. With regards to cultural and 
environmental rights, meanwhile, we can certainly establish the extent to which 
governments recognize rights in law, but evaluating how far they are put into practice 
is more difficult, especially since these rights are so new. And while quantitative 
sources can be problematic, relying on the claims and assertions of governments, 
social movements and NGOs, generally based on qualitative data, also has limitations 
in terms of inference, comparability and generalizability. There is also a risk in 
monitoring compliance of ‘freezing’ it at a particular moment in time (though this can 
be offset by emphasizing context and the evolution of rights discourses and delivery, 
as we do here).   
These difficulties mean that scholars tend to focus on human rights 
compliance in a limited set of issue-areas and/or in one or two countries. But there is 
an enormous value in trying to record the ‘big picture’ and compare a group of 
countries, linked by – broadly – a political preference for the Left.  In order to do so, 
we have taken a multi-pronged approach, relying on a mix of available quantitative 
datasets and qualitative empirical accounts. We combine information from different – 
and different types – of sources, including human rights databases such as Cingranelli 
and Richards (CIRI) 4 , Freedom House 5  and the Economic and Social Rights 
Empowerment Initiative6, socio-economic indicators from the World Bank (WB), the 																																																								
4 The CIRI Human Rights Dataset contains standards-based quantitative information on government 
respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 202 countries, annually from 1981-2011 
(www.humanrightsdata.com). 
5 The American NGO Freedom House has been publishing global annual reports on political rights and 
civil liberties since 1972 (https://freedomhouse.org).  
6 The Economic and Social Rights Empowerment Initiative provides a quantitative measurement and 
analysis regarding fulfilment of economic and social rights: the right to food, the right to adequate 
shelter, the right to healthcare, the right to education, the right to decent work, the right to social 
security, and protection against discrimination. At the core of the Initiative is the Index of Social and 
Economic Rights Fulfilment (SERF Index), which uses survey-based data published by national and 
international bodies to measure the performance of countries on the fulfilment of economic and social 
rights obligations (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., 2008).  
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United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC), descriptive accounts in key countries from international sources (AI; 
Human Rights Watch, HRW; United Nations, UN), and media accounts. Whenever 
possible we have combined qualitative and quantitative evidence. When quantitative 
data are not available (as in the case of cultural and environmental rights), we focus 
on legal and policy changes.   
Our sample includes Latin American countries where new Left governments 
committed to anti-neoliberal moderate to radical economic and social reform have 
been in power for a significant period of time (>5 years) between the late 1990s and 
the mid-2010s. This includes Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Nicaragua7, 
Uruguay and, more marginally, Brazil8. Dealing with this set of countries creates its 
own challenges since national differences and sub-regional identities in Latin 
America are significant. There is also considerable variation in terms of political 
economy, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), ethnic diversity, historical legacies and 
state-civil society interactions between countries and sub-regions. Distinguishing 
between the Andean region (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) and the Southern Cone 
(Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil) takes these differences into account at least to some 
degree, and allows us to highlights some significant differences in terms of 
engagement with human rights. Our analyses spans a 20 years timeframe whenever 
possible, and include a comparative sample of other continental Latin American 
countries9.  
 																																																								
7 Although Nicaragua can be included among Pink Tide countries, we exclude it here, since with only 
one Central American example (the Honduran example was of short duration and El Salvador is of 
more recent origin), we could not establish a separate sub-regional unit for analysis.  
8 Chilean left governments are excluded here because they have neither promised nor led a significant 
political economy shift and because the Chilean Left is still rooted in the experience of the 
Concertación Democratica, which predated of almost a decade the rise of the so-called Pink Tide. 
Navia (2009), for example, identifies the Chilean left as proponents of ‘neoliberalism with a human 
face’. Paraguay, and Peru (as well as Honduras and El Salvador) are excluded because of the limited 
time the Left was in office.   
9  This includes, whenever possible, all countries of continental Latin American (Belize, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Surinam), but excludes the Caribbean.  
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Human Rights after Democratization  
 
Latin America has historically played an active role in the global human rights 
movement (Sikkink, 2014). But the era of military dictatorships in the 1960s and 
1970s put an end to liberal internationalism; and indeed the liberal consensus about 
rights had begun to break down before the military intervened. Democratization in the 
1980s and 1990s served to realign the region with the international community once 
more (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). However, the new agenda of human rights was 
shaped by the legacy of extreme past violations of civil and political liberties, and the 
weight of a new political economy of neoliberalism, both of which permeated the 
institutions of democracy and understandings of citizenship.  
In the immediate period after democratization, the human rights focus was on 
establishing mechanisms for transitional justice to address abuses of political and civil 
rights. A decades-long process, this led to the creation of an impressive institutional 
architecture, from legal reforms and truth commissions to memorialization and oral 
history initiatives (Jelin, 2003; Lutz and Sikkink, 2000). While transitional justice has 
left an important legacy of emphasizing protection of political and civil liberties, it 
has also contributed to the initial perception that the protection of other human rights 
was somehow less important. As Paige (2009: 326) argues, only ‘measures of 
prosecutions, truth-telling, restitution, and reform of abusive state institutions—not 
some other measures of justice, such as those associated with claims for distributive 
justice—were recognized as the legitimate justice initiatives’. But, as neoliberal 
policies led to the roll-back of the state, the introduction of market-driven 
conceptualizations of citizenship and the shredding of the region’s social fabric as a 
consequence of austerity generated new demands for socio-economic rights for 
reasons both of governance and justice.  
This shift was accentuated by the fact that the international rights agreements, 
ratified enthusiastically by regional governments, increasingly addressed second and 
third generation rights and the importance of going beyond individualized political 
and civil entitlements. And, as the corpus of human rights was enlarged, the 
proliferation of Special Rapporteurs, Experts and Working Groups reporting to the 
UN Commission on Human Rights has kept the new rights agenda at the forefront of 
international politics. This context has influenced new Left governments more than 
has generally been understood. The Pink Tide emerged just at a moment when new 
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kinds of human rights were increasingly the focus of international attention, as well as 
the material of social claims being set out within the region. For this reason, some 
authors regard rights claims, socio-economic and cultural rights in particular, as 
constitutive of the new Left project (e.g. Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). It is clear 
simply by looking at the statements and claims made by left governments that human 
rights ideas are highly salient. Evo Morales, President of Bolivia (2005-present) has 
spoken of the need to treat the provision of ‘basic services [as] human rights’ (Sivak, 
2015), while Tabaré Vázquez, President of Uruguay (2005-2010 and 2015-present), 
on taking office for the second time, linked human rights directly to social care. What 
is much less clear – and what we hope to begin to set out here – is how far this 
language of rights translated into policies.  
 
Civil and Political Rights 
 
Political and civil rights are set out in the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), where they are linked to the ‘inalienable rights’ of the individual to 
freedom, justice, peace and dignity. Often referred to as the ‘first generation’ of rights, 
they comprise, on the one hand, freedom from unjustified interference by states and, 
on the other, the obligation of the state to protect citizens from violence and 
discrimination while guaranteeing their participation in the polity.  
Despite advances in the restoration of political rights and freedoms as part of 
the democratization process, basic civil and individual liberties are still far from 
guaranteed in Latin America. Discrimination based on ethnicity, gender and sexuality 
is common. Latin American citizens have concerns about lawlessness, violence, 
policing and security, corruption and interference by the state in the judiciary 
(Latinobarómetro, 2011; Ungar, 2002). Disappearances and extrajudicial executions 
remain an issue in some countries, Mexico and Colombia in particular. Any judgment, 
then, about respect for civil and political rights by new Left governments has to be set 
in the context of a region where compliance with basic political and civil rights is 
work in progress. 
All left-wing governments won power (and were reelected) through generally 
transparent and free processes. Citizens seem to place particularly high value on 
democracy in these countries: according to Latinobarómetro (2013), the greatest 
increase in support for democracy in the region, in comparison with the average for 
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1995-2013, has occurred in Venezuela and Ecuador, followed by Chile, Argentina, 
Bolivia and Brazil. But, equally, there are issues of concern. According to CIRI data, 
while Latin America is not improving overall in terms of freedom of speech and 
association and the independence of the judiciary, Andean left-wing countries in 
particular are significantly below the average (Fig. 1A-1B-1C). Similar trends in the 
countries’ in the respect of political rights and civil liberties10 as well as in their 
overall freedom status11 are highlighted by Freedom House, with Andean countries 
showing a consistent and significant deterioration while the Southern Cone has been 
above average since the early 2000s (Fig. 1D-1E-1F). One of the root causes of this 
problem – and it is especially marked in the Andean countries - is the concentration of 
authority in the hands of a strong executives, permitting a ‘winner takes all’ approach 
to key positions within the state (Flores‐Macías, 2012). Few incentives exist for 
cooperation with the opposition, or for governments to cede office since they know 
that in-coming administrations may seek to undo their work. Traditional political and 
economic elites, especially in the Andean region, reacted badly to the demands for 
radical change that carried the new Left into office. In both Venezuela and Bolivia, 
the political opposition and large landowners coordinated resistance against leftist 
governments and their supporters, ranging from targeted assassinations of peasant 
leaders and activists to promoting social unrest and trying to unseat the government 
via orchestrated coup d’état attempts12 (Enríquez, 2013; Tsolakis, 2008; Weisbrot and 
Sandoval, 2008). This has, in turn, fuelled cultures of intolerance of dissent in 																																																								
10 Freedom House adopts a one-to-seven scale to measure political rights (considering variables such as 
electoral process, political pluralism and participation and functioning of government) and civil 
liberties (including freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law and personal autonomy and individual rights). While in the Freedom House dataset, one represents 
the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/methodology, accessed 11 March 2017), the scores were reversed here (i.e. higher scores indicate 
greater respect for rights and vice versa) in order to ensure consistency with the other figures.  
11 A country’s freedom status (free, partly free or not free) is the result of the aggregated scores for the 
respect of political rights and civil liberties (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/methodology, accessed 11 March 2017).   
12 In Bolivia the 2008 social unrest resulted in 13 deaths and 30 injured in the clashes between 
supporters of Morales (most of them peasants from the remote Pando region) and opponents 
(Cusicanqui, 2015), while in Venezuela the coup attempt on the 11 April 2002 left 19 people killed and 
about 60 wounded (Wilpert, 2007). 
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government and accentuated the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted 
circle around the leader.  
	
	
	
Dotted line = Southern Cone sub-region:  Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay (average) 
Dashed line = Andean sub-region: Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela (average) 
Solid line = Other Latin American countries, excluding the Caribbean (average) 
 
Fig. 1A: 0 = complete government censorship of media / 1 = some government censorship / 2 = no 
government censorship  (authors’ calculation based on CIRI data, 2014). 
Fig. 1B: 0 = severely restricted or denied / 1 = limited for all or restricted/denied to a certain group / 2 
= virtually unrestricted (authors’ calculation based on CIRI data, 2014). 
Fig. 1C: 0 = no independent / 1 = partially independent / 2 = generally independent (authors’ 
calculation based on CIRI data, 2014). 
Fig 1D: 1 = not free / 2 = partially free / 3 = free (authors’ calculation based on Freedom House data, 
2017). 
Fig 1E: 1 = No respect of political rights / 7 = Full respect of political rights (authors’ calculation 
based on Freedom House data, 2017). 
Fig 1F: 1 = No respect of civil liberties / 2 = Full respect of civil liberties (authors’ calculation based 
on Freedom House data, 2017). 
 
In Venezuela, the centralization of state power by Hugo Chávez, President 
from 1998 until shortly before his death in 2013, led to high levels of media 
manipulation and government interference with the judiciary. These problems have 
persisted under Nicolás Maduro, Chávez’s chosen successor (HRW 2015a). As just 
one example of the state’s attempt to control the public sphere, opposition politicians 
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have experienced harassment, detention and even imprisonment; the decision to 
sentence the opposition leader Leopoldo López to 13 years in prison (recently been 
commuted to house arrest), has been condemned internationally because of its clear 
political motivation (Vivanco,	 2015). Moreover, since April 2017, the Supreme 
Court’s decision to revoke the legislative powers of the opposition controlled National 
Assembly triggered Venezuela’s worst political crisis since the Left is in power. The 
decision was reversed a few days later but social protests have continued, exacerbated 
by the President’s unilateral call for a Constitutional Assembly to rewrite the 
constitution drafted in mid-1999 as one of the first measures of late president Hugo 
Chávez. In just four months, almost hundred people have died and more than 360 
people had been arrested across the country (BBC News, 2017).  
Executive intolerance of opposition – and indeed its violent suppression - is 
not unique to Venezuela. In Ecuador, the government of Rafael Correa (replaced by 
Vice-President Lenin Moreno Garcés in 2017 in closely contested presidential 
elections) also sought to discredit opponents, although to a significantly lesser extent. 
Community leaders who criticize government policies have found themselves arrested, 
as was the case for Federico Guzmán, Efraín Arpi and Carlos Pérez, who served an 
eight-day sentence for obstructing a highway in protest against a proposed Water Law 
in 2010 (AI, 2015). The government also used new legislation to dissolve Fundación 
Pachamama, an independent indigenous and environmental rights organization (AI, 
2015), and, in 2015, shut down Fundamedios, which monitored the freedom of the 
media (Layme,  2013). In Bolivia, President Evo Morales has been highly intolerant 
of indigenous opposition, especially following the 2011 conflict over the construction 
of a road through the National Park and Indigenous Territory Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS). 
In 2015, the state attorney issued arrest warrants against indigenous leaders for 
murder, with some questioning whether a fair trial will be possible (HRW, 2015b), 
while the Danish NGO IBIS, well-known for its indigenous rights advocacy work, 
was expelled from the country in 2015 (Corz, 2013). 
These examples are illustrative of a trend on the part of Andean Lefts to limit 
association rights and their growing distrust of independent civil society (HRW, 
2015c). Inevitably, tensions are also developing with international human rights 
monitoring organizations as a result. HRW sent an open letter to President Morales 
criticizing the fact that the newly created national organization for the prevention of 
torture is not independent of the state and will, therefore, not be able easily to criticize 
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executive behaviour. HRW also pointed out that this apparently progressive law to 
eradication racism potentially empowers the government to censor the media (Latin 
American Herald Tribune  2014). Still, the criticisms by international rights monitors 
of the Bolivian government pale in comparison with those aimed at Venezuela, which 
have repeatedly denounced both Presidents Chávez and Maduro for eroding human 
rights guarantees13.  
These disputes have spilled over into conflict with regional human rights 
institutions. In 2010 President Chávez referred to the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights as a ‘mafia’, adding that the ‘last thing institutions such as that [one] 
(…) do is defend human rights’ (Primera, 2013). Venezuela left the IACHR in 2013 
(Zamorano, 2013), when the Court raised concerns about the state of democracy in 
the country (Organization of American States OAS, 2013). President Correa also 
signalled his intension to withdraw from the IACHR (La Prensa, 2013), which was 
echoed by President Morales, who called the Commission ‘another military base’ 
under the control of the Unites States (El Comercio, 2013). To an extent, at the heart 
of these disputes is the distrust with a regional legal order that depends on the OAS 
and thus includes the US. But, more fundamentally, the problems are the result of a 
vision of human rights as a vehicle for the advancement of socio-economic and 
cultural rights, and a sense of frustration with human rights discourses that give 
precedence to respect for liberal individualism.  
Not all Left governments share the view that there is an essential tension 
between collective and liberal rights, however. In particular, Uruguay and Brazil have 
combined commitment to advancing socio-economic rights with greater respect for 
civil liberties. The evidence from both the CIRI and the Freedom House datasets 
suggests that government performance in these two countries is above the regional 
average (Fig. 1). Argentina, meanwhile, occupies something of a middle position: 
there were tensions, with regard to freedom of the press, for example, with 
accusations of government intimidation against independent civil society, such as 
organizations that disputed official figures on economic performance and inflation, 
but they were much less extreme than in Venezuela or Bolivia (HRW, 2014).  																																																								
13 This report has been criticized, in turn, as a misrepresentation. Over 100 academic experts wrote to 
the HRW Board of Directors on Latin America in 2008 to complain that its work on Venezuela was 
motivated by an underlying political agenda and it did not “meet even the most minimal standards of 
scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility” (Various Authors, 2008).  
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The point, then, is that there is no automatic association between the new Left 
and a deterioration of civil and political liberties. But equally, the promotion and 
protection of civil and political freedoms in new Left regimes has been, at best, no 
better than the regional average and in some cases significantly worse. With the 
exception of Venezuela, whatever the rhetoric, the Andean governments are only 
marginally worse than the regional averages, pointing to the continuation of major 
abuses of political and civil rights and the need for progress almost everywhere.  
 
Social and Economic Rights 
 
Socio-economic rights were recognized as such in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and set out in detail in the International Covenant on Social and 
Economic Rights (1966). But despite this early codification, they were not 
traditionally seen as justiciable in law. It is only in the last twenty years that they have 
obtained a more ‘prominent place in advocacy, discourse and jurisprudence’ 
(Langford, 2008; Rodríguez-Garavito, 2011:7).  
In Latin America, socio-economic rights moved up the political agenda with 
the call in 1998 by international and regional NGOs for governments to take 
economic, social and cultural rights seriously. The Quito Declaration, as this came to 
be known, is viewed as the most important statement of economic, social and cultural 
rights to come out of the Global South (Jochnick and Mujica, 1999). In fact, Hugo 
Chávez’s statement that social rights are ‘public goods’ that ‘cannot be privatized’ 
(Sarfati,  2011) is, broadly, a view shared across the region’s Left. So it is not 
surprising that new Left governments have sought to take socio-economic rights more 
seriously than in the past and have used income generated from economic growth and 
corporate taxes for welfare.   
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Dotted line = Southern Cone sub-region:  Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay (average) 
Dashed line = Andean sub-region: Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela (average) 
Solid line = Other Latin American countries, excluding the Caribbean (average) 
 
Fig. 2A: Social public expenditure as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (authors’ 
calculation based on ECLAC data, 2015). 
Fig. 2B: GINI coefficient (authors’ calculation based on WB estimates, 2015). 
Fig. 2C: Extreme poverty headcount ratio of households (US$ 2.5 at 2005 PPP) based on national 
estimates (National Statistical Offices) (authors’ calculation based on SEDLAC, 2015). 
Fig. 2D: Percentage of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary, both men and women 
(authors’ calculation based on ECLAC data 2015).  
Fig. 2E: Share of salaried workers with right to pensions when retired (authors’ calculation based on 
SEDLAC data 2015).  
Fig. 2F: Deaths per 1,000 live births (authors’ calculation based on ECLAC data 2015). 
Fig. 2G: Deaths per 1,000 live births (authors’ calculation based on ECLAC data 2015). 
Fig. 2H: SERF Index (authors’ calculation based on SERF Index data, 2012). 
Fig. 2I: 0 = no economic rights / 1 = some economic rights under law but not effectively enforced / 2 = 
some economic rights under law and the government effectively enforced these rights in practice while 
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still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters / 3 = all or nearly all of 
women’s economic rights guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these 
laws in practice (authors’ calculation based on CIRI data, 2014). 
Fig. 2J: 0 = workers’ rights severely restricted / 1 = workers’ rights were somewhat restricted / 2 = 
workers’ rights fully protected (authors’ calculation based on CIRI data, 2014). 
 
There was a rise in social expenditures across the region after 2004, 
particularly in new Left-run countries (Fig. 2A). Public spending has been used to 
create new forms of social incorporation (Rossi, 2015) and to establish a ‘“floor” of 
social rights which cannot be left up to market forces’ (Martínez Franzoni and 
Sanchéz-Ancochea, 2014: 275), including greater pension coverage, access to health 
and social insurance. Even in Uruguay, where social coverage was already high, 
access has been expanded and primary care strengthened. In Bolivia, where social 
coverage was previously very poor, reforms have included the introduction of a 
minimum non-contributory pension scheme, which offers a pension to the self-
employed and workers in the informal sector for the first time (Renta Dignidad). New 
cash transfer programmes to improve education and infant and maternal health have 
also been set up (Bonos Juancito Pinto and Juana Azurduy). Similar schemes have 
been introduced in Ecuador14. New types of welfare programme targeted at specific 
sectors have also been established such as Discapacitados in Ecuador (for people with 
disabilities) and Cuidados in Uruguay (for domestic care workers). Uruguay has taken 
the lead internationally in recognizing the rights of the country’s domestic workers 
and in implementing a wage bargaining system for them in 2012, as well as 
introducing a programme of labour inspections to enforce the law (ILO, 2012).  
																																																								
14 Cash transfer programmes have not been a prerogative of left-wing governments. In fact they were 
first introduced by neoliberal governments in the 1990s and funded by the World Bank and the 
Interamerican Development Bank. ECLAC has an open access dataset of these programmes, which 
includes information on duration, investments, goals, number of beneficiaries, among others. See 
http://dds.cepal.org/bdptc/.  
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Dotted line = Southern Cone sub-region:  Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay (average) 
Dashed line = Andean sub-region: Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela (average) 
Solid line = Other Latin American countries, excluding the Caribbean (average) 
 
Fig. 3: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita (authors’ 
calculation based on IMF data, 2015). 	
 
Growth across the region has contributed to the decline in income inequality 
in the 2000s in most of the region (Fig. 2B) (Lustig et al., 2013). But the performance 
of new Left governments is better (in the Southern Cone) or shows faster 
improvements (in the Andean region) than regional averages on a number of fronts, 
from poverty reduction (Fig. 2C), to primary education (Fig. 2D) and access to 
pensions (Fig. 2E). Furthermore, the gap has closed between the low-medium income 
countries under the Left and the rest of the region in relation to both infant and 
maternal mortality rates (Fig. 2F and 2G). These trends are supported by data from 
the Economic and Social Rights Fulfilment Index (SERF). As shown in Figure 2H, 
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between 2002 and 2012, while other Latin American countries saw their scores 
getting worse, on average, new Left-run countries show positive trends. In particular, 
these countries registered better performances, on average, compared to other 
countries in the area, on education access (95,7 vs. 86.3), right to food (76,4 vs. 71,7), 
housing (77,7 vs. 77), and workers’ income (88,8 vs. 79,5). Overall, it is hard not to 
conclude that investments in social expenditure by the new Left have led to greater 
compliance with social rights, with greatest improvements in the countries of the 
Southern Cone.  
Nevertheless, there are some important social and economic rights that remain 
unaddressed. Improvements in women’s rights have been particularly disappointing. 
Most countries (with the noticeable exception of Uruguay) do not recognize 
reproductive rights as a fundamental human right and the Left has generally failed to 
challenge or reform some of the most restrictive reproductive health laws and policies 
in the world, particularly with regard to abortion (Center for Reproductive Rights and 
Inter-American Dialogue 2015). Women’s economic rights – including equal pay, 
employment protection and equal access to the labour market - also show no marked 
improvements. Apart from Venezuela and Uruguay, which have pioneered a 
recognition of unpaid housework as work, no substantial improvements have been 
achieved with regard to women’s rights in the last two decades, including in countries 
governed by the new Left. (Fig. 2I).  
And, although income inequality is falling, workers’ rights are also advancing 
slowly, and may even be deteriorating in some areas (Fig. 2J). Labour conflict is 
widespread, particularly in Ecuador and Bolivia (Calderón et al. 2012). According to 
some analysts, in Ecuador, the new Labour Code limits the right of strike (Santilla 
Ortíz and Webber, 2015). Local rights activists have denounced what they see as a 
new ‘phase of deregulation and labour flexibilization’ (Programa Andino de Derechos 
Humanos,  2010). In Bolivia, meanwhile, the labour movement has faced violent 
repression, especially in the mining sector (US Department of State, 2015) and 
despite having one of the highest numbers of working children internationally (US 
Department of State, 2011), the country has recently challenged international 
agreements on child labor by lowering the legal minimum age to ten years old for 
self-employed children and twelve years old for salaried children (Fontana and Grugel, 
2015).   
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Cultural and Environmental Rights 
 
Unlike the first and second generation of human rights, third generation, or cultural 
and environmental rights, are enjoyed collectively and, as such, are not primarily 
about the protection of individuals. They thus challenge the classic liberal rights 
framework and its presumptions of a universal model of citizenship. Third generation 
rights have been codified only relatively recently, with the ratification of the ILO 169 
Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (1992). Latin America moved quickly to recognize 
the principle of indigenous rights and a number of countries in the region have 
introduced legal and constitutional reforms to operationalize them. In the 1990s, 
‘multicultural constitutionalism’ replaced earlier assimilationist strategies that dated 
back to the colonial era (Van Cott,  2000). This was followed by new institutional 
architectures of recognition that attempt to reconcile collective rights with individual 
rights (Radcliffe, 2012). These, however, vary significantly, from pioneering reforms 
in Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia, to more embryonic changes in Chile, Argentina 
and Venezuela. 
Of the new Left governments, Bolivia and Ecuador have pioneered the most 
extensive recognition of cultural rights. Both ILO Convention 169 and the UN 
Declaration on indigenous rights have been incorporated in new constitutions. Bolivia 
has also redefined the basis of its statehood, becoming a ‘plurinational’ state to reflect 
the presence of multiple indigenous peoples. This has triggered a process of 
institutionalization of new local autonomy regimes as well as the introduction of 
parliamentary seats for ethnic minorities (Radcliffe, 2012; Fontana, 2014a). The pace 
of change is significantly slower in Venezuela, although the 1999 Constitution grants 
new rights to indigenous peoples, including representation in the National Assembly, 
the recognition of the distinctive social, political, and economic practices of their 
communities, and the rights to culture, language, and land. In Argentina, meanwhile, 
progress is distinctly patchy, with most indigenous land claims going unaddressed, 
although there was an agreement in 2006 to map indigenous territories and prohibit 
new land evictions until at least 2017 (Castro, 2013). 
 Some new Left governments have also opted for the introduction of 
affirmative action schemes as a way to promote the visibility of minorities and 
indigenous communities (Hernandez,  2013). Brazil passed what is considered ‘the 
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most extensive affirmative action law in the Americas, and possibly the world’ in 
2012 (Walsh,  2015: 26), as a result of which 50% of public university places must be 
reserved for low-income and Afro-Brazilian students. In 2013 Uruguay’s law on 
affirmative action creates a quota of 8% in the workplace, the public sector and in 
education for Afro-Uruguayans and introduces Afro-Uruguayan history into the 
national curriculum.  
Clearly, then, there are considerable legal advances. But these rights are still 
untested ground and the new legislation is difficult to implement. The process of 
indigenous land titling, which is considered the sine qua non of indigenous 
recognition, is moving slowly everywhere. Moreover, in some cases, land titling and 
indigenous empowerment is creating additional social conflict since it is not always 
clear who and why some communities are benefiting from the new legislation and 
others are not (Fontana and Grugel, 2016; McNeish, 2013).   
The picture is not dissimilar with regard to environmental rights. Ecuador 
became the first country in the world to recognize the rights of nature in its 
Constitution. Article 71 boldly says:  
 
Nature or Pacha Mama [Mother Earth, in Kichwa], where life is reproduced and occurs, 
has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and 
regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All 
persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce 
the rights of nature (…).  
 
Bolivia’s 2010 Law of Mother Earth was also a historic guarantee of the rights 
of nature. President Morales spoke out strongly in favour of an international 
recognition of Mother Earth rights at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit on Climate 
Change15 and his outspoken advocacy helped push the UN towards the recognition of 
the right to water in 2010. 
Nevertheless, even more than indigenous rights, environmental rights are 
really only embryonic. In Ecuador and Bolivia, governments speak of the introduction 
of concrete measures such a ban on genetically modified crops, the creation of a 
‘biopolis’, the protection of biodiversity, payment for ecosystem services and 
establishing an Environmental Ombudsman (Barié, 2014), but in practice, little of this 																																																								
15 http://laperspectives.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/political-report-1049-corrupted.html 
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has been achieved. There are also some contradictions between these outspoken 
endorsements to environmental rights and the practices of government-sponsored 
intensive exploitation of natural resources (Bebbington  and Bebbington, 2011; Hill, 
2015). In fact, in both Bolivia and Ecuador, natural resources exploitation in protected 
areas has increased under left-wing governments in order to provide the financial 
revenues for welfare. These contradictions are also reflected in the combination of 
enthusiastic ratification of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change by all Latin 
American governments, including the Left, and inadequate and lukewarm 
commitment to meeting global temperature targets in practice16.  
 
The New Left Agenda of Human Rights: Evaluating the Record So Far 
 
The new Left in Latin America has certainly created a broader and more diffuse rights 
agenda. There has been a shift away from purely political and civil rights associated 
with liberal variants of democracy. These changes challenge the still widespread view 
that socio-economic and collective rights are somehow ‘lesser’ rights than political 
and civil entitlements. But, not surprisingly, second and third generation rights are 
still very fragile in practice. Framing issues such as welfare, land ownership and the 
environment as human rights implies a major rethink in the purpose of policy and the 
nature of social policy, while arguing that the three generation of rights - political-
civil, socio-economic and cultural-environmental - should be regarded as equally 
important is, in practice, very difficult in liberal democracies that have historically 
tended to protect the political and civil rights of citizens whilst resisting the 
justiciability of other sorts of rights.  
The evidence suggests that governments have embraced elements of that 
canon more enthusiastically than others. In effect, rather than simply complying with 
international rights regimes, some new Left governments are also attempting to 
counter the traditional hierarchy of rights in which liberal individual rights take 
precedence (Farer, 1992). This is of immense significance practically for how rights 
are understood. It is also of considerable theoretical significance since there are 
relatively few examples where socio-economic, cultural and environmental rights 
have been taken so seriously.  																																																								
16 http://climateactiontracker.org 
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The extent to which the human rights agenda has shifted in Latin America is 
only now beginning to be recognized. Certainly, the promotion and protection of 
cultural and indigenous rights has attracted scholarly attention, especially in Andean 
countries, for a number of years now (Brysk, 2000; Yashar, 2005). But commitment 
to second generation rights constitutes ‘a quiet revolution’, without precedent in the 
region, according to Magdalena Sepúlevda Carmona (2014), the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights. From the introduction of 
pensions for workers in the informal sector to the shift from conditionality in child 
welfare programmes, from the advancement of domestic workers’ rights to new forms 
of ‘health diplomacy’ (Riggirozzi, 2014), the new Left – whatever its problems – has 
set fresh standards for social inclusion.  
At the same time, it is clear that the enactment of all types of rights varies 
considerably between countries. There is a greater commitment to the ‘full spectrum’ 
of human rights in the Southern Cone, while Andean governments sometimes act as if 
there was a trade-off between respect for liberal political and civil rights and socio-
economic and collective rights advances – and prefer to choose the latter. These 
differences have multiple causes, which range from the variation in leadership style, 
executive authority administration and tolerance of political transitions - with the 
Andean countries showing greater degrees of political tensions and radicalization - to 
historical differences - with the Southern Cone closer to Western liberal traditions. 
The stronger cut with Western influences has made it relatively easier for the Andean 
countries to follow less orthodox paths of human rights compliance, once popular 
dissatisfaction with the capacity of liberal democracy to deliver reduction in 
inequality and wellbeing became clearer.  
As the era of leftist governance begins to draw to a close, we should ask 
whether this new agenda of human rights is secure. There are at least three 
intertwined issues to consider here: economic growth and its sustainability; the 
increasingly apparent electoral exhaustion of the Left in Latin America; and how 
governments will deal with the tensions and trade-offs between different kinds of 
rights.  
Across the region, the expansion of second generation rights has been 
underpinned by economic growth, in the order of 4.2% in Latin America between 
2004-2013. This period has come to an end. Growth fell to 1.3% in 2014 and some of 
the larger economies, Brazil notably, registered negative growth. Economic growth 
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enabled the creation of reserves –14.8% of regional GDP (Deloitte, 2015) – which 
minimised the social costs of the slow-down, but the global fall in commodity prices 
will mean a decline in government income and a drop in public spending over the 
medium term. There are risks of inequality rising once again, especially since the 
overall tax base remains narrow (Goñi  et al., 2011). The Andean countries are 
particularly vulnerable here, with social gains in the Southern Cone significantly more 
protected.   
These issues are exacerbated by the manner of the Left’s electoral decline. In 
Argentina, Kirchnerismo was narrowly defeated in the Presidential elections of 2015. 
Argentina’s new President, Mauricio Macri, represents a right-wing coalition that is 
not only ideologically opposed to key aspects of the new Left agenda, but a firm 
adherent to a return to market-led development. The economic context is not 
particularly buoyant, with rising levels of inflation – estimated to be in the order of 
25-30% - falling export prices and renewed pressure from producers and investors. 
Retrenchment in terms of public spending has begun to happen, though haphazardly 
as yet, and there is little evidence that the poorest groups are being more protected in 
the process. Meanwhile, in Venezuela, hyper-inflation and severe shortages of even 
basic goods have wiped out social and economic gains established in earlier years and 
debt default is likely, as the Right – once again ideologically opposed to high levels of 
public spending – is gaining terrain. In Brazil, the dominance of the Worker’s Party, 
which has overseen the most dramatic reduction in inequality in the region, was 
overthrown by an unprecedented political crisis that culminated in a controversial 
process of impeachment and destitution of the President Dilma Rousseff and a de 
facto shift to a centre-right government.  
Meanwhile, in Ecuador and Bolivia, it is hard to see how tensions between the 
intensification of the extractive economy and the project of collective and 
environmental rights can be avoided in the future as conflicts between the state, 
private companies and rural communities increase (Bebbington and Bebbington, 
2011; Fontana, 2014b). In the end, these governments have opted for a traditional 
understanding of development as growth and spending which is at odds with the idea 
of environmental rights and possibly even with the project of Buen Vivir. While this 
has not yet undermined their legitimacy, as the victory of Correa’s party (Alianza-
PAIS) in the 2017 Presidential elections in Ecuador testifies, there is no getting away 
from the fact that even the more radical ‘postneoliberal alternatives’ (Radcliffe,  2015: 
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864) have not developed a sufficiently innovative model of resource governance, 
capable of respecting the rights of the environment and driving growth to sustain 
public spending at the same time. There are therefore serious doubts as to whether the 
more radical reforms will survive (Weyland et al., 2010).  
 
Conclusion 
 
For Arnson (2007: 8), ‘regardless of whether the predominance of Left or populist 
governments in Latin America today is a transitory phenomenon – another “swing of 
the pendulum” – or whether it represents a more enduring shift, the specific practices 
and policies adopted by these governments will mark the future of democratic politics 
in the region’. This early assessment of the Pink Tide governments was remarkably 
prescient. It is now clear that the Left’s electoral dominance in the first fifteen years 
of the twenty first century has significantly reshaped the region’s engagement with 
human rights ideas and practices. But it has done so in complex and sometimes 
contradictory ways for, as Ruckert, MacDonald and Proulx (2016) conclude, it makes 
little sense to treat the Pink Tide (or postneoliberalism) as a single unified 
phenomenon. Policies and institutions – and, we would suggest, human rights 
practices - vary too much for that to make sense.  The human rights agenda in the 
region is complex not simply because it is more diffuse  – which rights matter? – but 
because different rights matter in different countries and sub-regions. Without going 
as far as accepting Castaneda’s simplistic and over-determined notions of the ‘two 
Lefts’, it is hard not to acknowledge that there are different understandings of human 
rights at play between the Andes and the Southern Cone that reflect a combination of 
cultural patterns of historical engagement and the priorities of governments.  
It is clear, then, that we stand at a crucial moment in terms of Latin America’s 
engagement not only with the Left but with its record on human rights. With an eye to 
future research, therefore, we want to draw attention here to two issues. The first is 
the need to explore more fully what stands in the way in Latin America of 
governments accepting the full spectrum of human rights; or, put differently, how can 
the pursuit of socio-economic, cultural and environmental rights be made compatible 
with the agenda of democratization and full respect for political and civil liberties? 
All these rights are vital elements in the creation of more equal societies and more 
effective democracies, yet even in the Southern Cone, where conflicts over political 
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and civil rights are milder, there are still tensions between different rights agendas and 
generations of rights. Do the problems lie in the realm of ideas, social practices, 
institutional weaknesses or within the state itself? A deeper understanding of the 
obstacles that get in the way of to better delivery of the full human rights spectrum 
would make a considerable contribution to scholarly understanding of regional 
democratization. 
Our second point refers to how we study human rights in the future. So far, the 
human rights literature on Latin America has been shaped above all around political 
rights and civil liberties and transitional justice. The influence of international law on 
the discipline of human rights is considerable and, in Latin America, judicial activism 
and the generation of imaginative mechanisms for dealing with the traumas of the past 
has encouraged this trend. Yet scholars of social movements often use ‘rights’ in a 
broader sense and, like the organizations they study, focus on the gap between the 
promise of international rights agreements and the reality of everyday rights 
experience (Farmer, 2004). There is a considerable literature, some of which we have 
drawn on here - in anthropology, geography, international development, ecology, and 
social movement studies - that explores the deployment of old and new rights in 
practice. Building bridges between those literatures and the detailed study of how 
second and third generation rights operate, discursively and in practice, is now 
necessary to fully comprehend the trajectory of human rights in Latin America and 
elsewhere.  
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